Radioative Tuna
Meanwhile, a professor at Tokyo University discovered that fish from the ship were highly radioctive.
News of the situation caused a panic and an immediate freeze on fish purchases in the city. The professor requested information from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, but his cable was never transmitted by the chief of the Tokyo wire service on the grounds that it was alarmist. Weeks later, Senator Pastore, a member of the joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy, returned the United State and issued an optimistic opinion on the fishermen's health. He was another in a long line of Senator's with extensive scientific training, a tradition that has culminated today with
Senator James Inhofe of Oklahmoma.
Under pressure from Japan, the U.S. enlarged the danger zone in the nuke proving grounds, which encompassed major Japanese fishing areas. All boats fishing in this area, or taking passage through
it, were required to put in at five designated ports and be
inspected for radioactivity.
Consumer hysteria increased as 750 tons of tuna were stored in warehouses. The Misaki fish market was closed, precipitating a panic among the fish dealers. The hysteria spread to nearby
Yokohama and then to Tokyo itself. The great Tokyo Central
Wholesale Market closed for the first time since the cholera
epidemic of 1935. None of these measures worked well. When it
became known that fish had been banned from the Emperor's diet,
people became even more worried. Prices plummeted to still lower
depths and some fish dealers were forced into bankruptcy.
Ambassador John M. Allison sought to take some of the
sting out of the criticisms by issuing a press release on March 19,
in which he said theat he was "authorized to make clear that the
Unites States is prepared to take such steps as may be necessary to
insure fair and just compensation if the facts so warrant."
A US congressman, Melvin Price from Illinois (predecessor of
John Shimkus), commented that the
presence of the Japanese fishing boat so close to the blast
indicated that a Soviet submarine could have come even closer. At
this point, Representative W. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint
Atomic Committee, was interpreted in the Japanese press as
suggesting that the Lucky Dragon may have been on a spying mission.
This suggestion infuriated the Japanese.
Although the Lucky Dragon incident did make the front pages of U.S. papers on St. Patricks Day 1954, the radioative tuna issue did not seem to resonate with the editors.
The AEC (charged with both regulating and promoting atomic energy) released the following statement: "The opinion of the American Energy Commission scientific staff based on
long-term studies of fish in the presence of radioactivity is that
there is negligible hazard, if any, in the consumption of fish
caught in the Pacific Ocean outside the immediate test area
subsequent to tests....Any radioactivity collected in the test area
would become harmless within a few miles....and completely
undetectable within 500 miles or less...."
Dispite the AEC's assurannces, on March
27 the Koei Maru ( Radiant Glory) put into the port of Mastic with thirty-seven tons of tuna, which was found to be radioactive above the level established by the Ministry of Health
and Welfare. Meanwhile (this is good), American fish dealers indicated that Japanese standards for radiation WERE NOT RIGID enough and began rejecting fish that was even slightly contaminated.
West Coats tuna canneries were alerted to the radioactivity problem. Records of the food and
Drug Administration show that two radioactive fish were picked up at one cannery. No details other than that the " radioactivity was insignificant" are available, but it is known that secret meeting
took place between representatives of tuna industry, the Food and
Drug Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State
Department. An acceptable level of radioactivity was agreed upon
at this meeting but the level was classified as "confidential" and
not released to the public. Ever.
